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THE STATUS OF SAME SEX ADOPTION IN 
THE KEYSTONE STATE SUBSEQUENT TO 
THE STATE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
IN ADOPTION OF R.B.F. AND R.C.G. 
Martha Elizabeth Lieberman* 
“Today a child who receives proper nutrition, adequate schooling 
and supportive sustaining shelter is among the fortunate, whatever 
the source. A child who also receives the love and nurture of even 
a single parent can be counted among the blessed. Here this Court 
finds a child who has all of the above benefits and two adults (a 
lesbian couple) dedicated to his welfare, secure in their loving 
partnership, and determined to raise him to the very best of their 
considerable abilities . . . .”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The demographic changes in the United States over the past 
century make it difficult to describe an average American family.2 
Today, a diversity of perspectives on morality and individual 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., Ithaca College, 2000. The 
author would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy. 
1 Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (holding that an 
unmarried same-sex partner could adopt her partner’s biological child). 
2 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (holding that a 
Washington state court decision granting grandparents visitation rights to their 
grandchildren over the objections of the sole surviving parent—a “fit, custodial 
mother”—violated the mother’s substantive due process rights, and finding that 
a family can consist of mother and child); See also NANCY E. WALKER ET. AL., 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1999) (discussing how the term 
“family” now includes households where the parents are divorced, households 
where grandparents act as parents, and single parent households). 
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freedoms has produced a spectrum of views on what constitutes a 
family.3 Families whose heads of household are gay or lesbian are 
just one part of that spectrum. Between one and nine million 
children in the United States are estimated to have at least one gay 
or lesbian parent.4 While gay or lesbian couples raise children in 
every state, the law, as determined by state government in 
Pennsylvania in particular, does not afford them the same parental 
rights it affords biological or adoptive parents.5 
Numerous gay and lesbian couples, in planning their lives 
together, are seeking to adopt children or undergo in vitro6 
                                                          
3 William C. Duncan, Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down: The “Functional” 
Definition of Family-Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
57, 66 (2001). Duncan states the following: 
In today’s society, where increased mobility, changes in social mores 
and increased individual freedom have created a wide spectrum of 
arrangements filling the role of the traditional nuclear family, flexibility 
in the application of standing principles is required in order to adapt 
those principles to the interests of each particular child. 
Id. at 66. 
4 COMMITTEE ON PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF CHILD AND FAMILY HEALTH, 
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, COPARENT OR SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION BY 
SAME-SEX PARENTS (vol. 109, number 3, 2002) (reporting that pediatricians 
should make every effort to support second-parent adoption because of its 
advantages to the children involved) [hereinafter AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS 
REPORT]. 
5 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2525 (West 2001). The Statute states in 
pertinent part: 
The court shall cause an investigation to be made and a report filed 
by . . . an appropriate person designated by the court . . . . The 
investigation shall cover all pertinent information regarding the child’s 
eligibility for adoption and the suitability of the placement, including 
the physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child, and 
the child’s and the adopting parent’s age, sex, health and racial, ethnic 
and religious background. 
Id.  See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.L.P., 16 Fiduc. Rep.2d 95, 98 (Montg. Co. 
Orphans’ Ct. Pa. 1998) (rejecting the application of a lesbian partner to become 
an adoptive parent of a child). 
6 See MARTHA FIELD, DO NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES THREATEN 
THE FAMILY? 34 (1988). Field says that in vitro fertilization: 
refers to the process by which a doctor stimulates a woman’s ovaries, 
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fertilization to establish families.7 For many of them, gaining 
recognition of legal parental status for the same-sex partner of the 
natural or adoptive parent has been an intense struggle.8 
Alternative families, face a difficult task in becoming integrated 
within the confines of existing adoption laws.9 In Pennsylvania, for 
                                                          
removes several eggs in a procedure called a laparoscopy, and fertilizes 
them in a Petri dish . . . . Two or three days later, when each egg has 
divided a few times the doctor can transfer the eggs to the uterus of the 
woman providing the eggs, with the hope of producing a “test-tube” 
baby nine months later. 
Id. 
7 See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that in 
vitro fertilization is an alternative insemination technique and that “[t]he woman 
or women may choose to become pregnant using sperm from a completely 
anonymous donor, from a donor who has agreed to be identifiable when the 
child becomes an adult, or from a fully known donor (e.g., a friend or a relative 
of the nonconceiving partner)”). 
8 See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 2000) (denying custody 
to the former same-sex partner of a lesbian mother because it would be too 
disruptive for the family, but granting visitation rights instead); E.N.O. v. 
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999) (granting a former lesbian same-sex 
partner visitation rights after the couple separated); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 
533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (denying custody to the former same sex 
partner and remanding the issue of visitation rights to determine if it was in the 
best interest of the child). 
9 See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: 
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 
341, 344 (2002) (arguing that the current statutory framework for recognizing 
lesbian second-parent adoption is too complicated and actually only ends up 
hurting the child and the relationship that child has with her parents).  The 
adoption process is complicated, both legally and emotionally, because it is a 
lengthy course involving fulfillment of many statutory requirements and is 
taxing on family relationships. See infra Part I.A-B (discussing the history and 
implications of adoption law on families in Pennsylvania). Common issues 
faced by newly forming adoptive families include attachment, family 
reorganization and resolution of differences in sexuality, gender, class and race. 
Gay and lesbian adoptive families face these issues and additionally must 
contend with being part of a sexual minority in an often unsympathetic, 
heterosexually dominant society. See Steven E. James, Clinical Themes in Gay-
and Lesbian-Parented Adoptive Families, CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHIATRY 475, 480 (2002) (arguing that adoption by gay and lesbians 
deserves particular attention by the mental health community because of the 
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example, there is no statutory or common law prohibition against 
gays and lesbians adopting a child who has no legal parents.10  On 
the other hand same-sex couples that attempt to adopt in 
Pennsylvania are often thwarted because of a statutory provision 
requiring a biological or original adoptive parent to terminate his 
parental rights prior to approval of an adoption petition filed by his 
partner.11 It seems unreasonable to allow same-sex couples to 
adopt a child with no legal parents without difficulty but prohibit 
or set hurdles for those same couples adopting the biological child 
of their same-sex partner. 
On August 20, 2002, however, in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and 
R.C.G.,12 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that unmarried 
same-sex partners may adopt a child without meeting the statutory 
requirement that the legal parent first relinquish his parental 
rights.13 This groundbreaking decision was hailed as a “win for 
gays and lesbians across the commonwealth.”14 The Court held 
that trial courts have discretion to find cause to waive the statutory 
relinquishment requirement.15 The court remanded the 
                                                          
unique psychological issues it raises for all involved). 
10 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (1981) (stating “any individual may 
become an adopting parent”). 
11 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (West 2001) (“Unless the court for 
cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless 
the natural parent or parents’ rights have been terminated . . . .”). There is a 
spousal exception. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2903 (West 2001) 
(“Whenever a parent consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the 
parent-child relationship between him and his child shall remain whether or not 
he is one of the petitioners in the adoption proceeding.”). 
12 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002). 
13 Id. 
14 Lori Litchman, Pennsylvania High Court Oks Second-Parent Adoption, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 21, 2002, at B-1 (reporting on the beneficial 
impact of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision for gay and lesbian 
couples in Pennsylvania who are raising children). 
15 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1197 (finding that the 
statute “affords the trial court discretion to determine whether, under the 
circumstances of a particular case, cause has been shown to demonstrate why a 
particular statutory requirement has not been met”). See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 2901 (West 2001) (“Unless the court for cause shown determines 
otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or 
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consolidated cases to the trial level to determine if cause had been 
shown to waive the relinquishment requirement.16 On remand, the 
petitioners in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G. will have to 
argue that cause exists to waive the relinquishment requirement 
because the child is already being raised by the same-sex couple 
and it would be in the best interest of the child to be legally related 
to both of her parents.17 
This note supports the outcome in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and 
R.C.G.,18 but disagrees with the court’s reasoning, which fails to 
effectuate the purpose of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act—to 
ensure the welfare of the child.19 This note suggests that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should have taken the extra step of 
setting a clear standard for the trial courts to use upon remand and 
in future cases. This note also suggests that the Pennsylvania 
legislature should take proactive measures to protect the best 
interest of children by recognizing second-parent adoptions.20 
                                                          
parents’ rights have been terminated . . . .”). Prior to 1982, the section read: 
“Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption 
shall be entered unless the adoptee has resided with the petitioner for at least six 
months prior thereto or, in lieu of such residence, the adoptee is at least 18 years 
of age or is related by blood or marriage to the petitioner.” See 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 2901 (West 1981). 
16 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1195. 
17 LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opens Door to 
Second-Parent Adoption, Sept. 2002 (reporting on the decision of in In re 
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.). When a same-sex partner seeks to adopt the 
biological or adopted child of his partner, he is seeking formal parental rights 
protecting his interests in the child in case of possible custody disputes should 
the partnership dissolve. He is seeking to be a second-parent. In addition, 
adoption protects the child by declaring legal parents responsible for her well-
being and providing formal rights to inheritance and social security benefits 
should her legal parents die. See Symposium, Re-Orienting Law and Sexuality: 
Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Couples in Ohio: Unsettled and 
Unsettling Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 101, 116 (2000) [hereinafter Becker] 
(arguing for recognition of second-parent adoption in order to give families 
stability). 
18 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1195. 
19 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2724 (a)-(b) (West 2001). See language of 
the statute supra note 5. 
20 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (stating in second-
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Part I of this note examines the development of adoption laws 
and second-parent adoption in Pennsylvania. Part II analyzes the 
factual and procedural history of R.B.F. Part III discusses the 
implications of R.B.F., critiques the vague standards given by the 
court and suggests clearer standards for use by the trial court on 
remand and in future proceedings. Part IV argues that the 
legislature should take affirmative action to protect the best interest 
of children of same sex couples by approving second-parent 
adoption. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF ADOPTION LAW AND HISTORY OF SECOND-
PARENT ADOPTIONS 
Adoption is a statutory right, unknown at common law.21  
Although Congress has influence over the construction of adoption 
laws, adoption is generally a question reserved for state 
regulation.22 This section examines the development and purpose 
                                                          
parent adoption, “children born or adopted into families headed by partners who 
are of the same-sex usually have only [one] biologic or adoptive legal parent. 
The other partner in a parental role is called the “coparent” or “second-parent”). 
See also Becker, supra note 17, at 115 (supporting recognition of second-parent 
adoption); Jacobs, supra note 9, at 343 (proposing that the courts use a 
“statutory parental analytic framework, the UPA, to adjudicate maternity for 
lesbian coparents, thereby conferring all the rights and privileges of legal 
parenthood” and thus fully protecting the relationship between a child and her 
lesbian coparent). 
21 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (West 2001) (“The court of 
common pleas of each county shall exercise through the appropriate division 
original jurisdiction over voluntary relinquishment, involuntary termination and 
adoption proceedings.”). 
22 GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ADOPTION: 
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND CHILDREN’S INTERESTS, 30 (1994). Stevens explains 
that: 
At the time the Constitution was adopted, its framers felt that states 
should have jurisdiction over most domestic family law questions. 
Article I § 8 of the Constitution, the so-called enumerated powers 
clause, limits congressional authority to act by specifying general 
subject categories where federal action is permissible. Under this clause 
and the Tenth Amendment, categories other than those enumerated are 
reserved for state action. These enumerated powers do not readily 
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of adoption laws in Pennsylvania and the current process for 
adopting a child. This section will also analyze how statutory 
requirements have affected the development of second-parent 
adoption. 
A.  Statutory Adoption in Pennsylvania 
In 1925, the Pennsylvania legislature codified adoption, 
thereby authorizing and defining the procedural parameters of 
adoption.23 The law generally sanctioned adoption to provide a 
legal heir to families without male offspring and offered a 
permanent family to children whose biological parents could not or 
would not raise them.24 
For much of the twentieth century, the adoption process was so 
guarded it created the illusion that an adopted child was actually 
the adoptive parents’ biological child.25 Birth parents rarely met 
adoptive parents, the facts of the adoption were hidden from public 
view and often the adopted child was not even informed the she 
was adopted.26 Historically, the law reflected this societal attitude 
by requiring the sealing of adoption records and making it difficult 
for adoptees to obtain information about their birth parents.27 The 
secretiveness of the process began to be questioned as parents 
started to adopt children from foreign countries, adoptive parents 
                                                          
encompass most family law questions, so what federal legislation there 
is in this area is usually based on some other federal interest, such as 
conditions on federal grants. Thus, Congress has little express authority 
to legislate in this area, and the individual states have the primary 
authority. 
Id. at 6. See also Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (holding that 
state laws govern the area of domestic relations except in rare occasions when 
family law comes into conflict with a federal statute). 
23 127 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1 (West 1925). 
24 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM ET. AL., THE RIGHTS OF FAMILIES 204 (1996) 
(discussing the procedure and implication of adoption law). 
25 See id. at 203 (discussing the social policy reasons for keeping adoptions 
secret including shame). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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increasingly informed their children about their adoption at 
younger ages, and meetings between birth parents and adoptive 
parents became routine.28 
As social policy shifted during the century, the statutes were 
amended numerous times.29 These amendments were also 
propagated to codify the court’s interpretation of the laws.30 In 
1970, in response to society’s changing attitude towards adoption 
as something more acceptable, the Pennsylvania legislature passed 
the Adoption Act, replacing the earlier adoption statutes.31 The 
Adoption Act defines who may adopt, who may be adopted, and 
sets forth the requirements for the contents of an adoption 
petition.32 While adoption law has developed in many ways, the 
                                                          
28 Id. 
29 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102 (West 2001) (listing the 1947, 
1970, 1981 and 1982 amendments to the Adoption Act). 
30 Symposium, Constructing Family, Constructing Change: Shifting Legal 
Perspectives on Same-Sex Relationships: Panel One: Family Law: Article: 
Binding the Family Ties: A Child Advocacy Perspective on Second-Parent 
Adoptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 270 (Spring 1998) 
[hereinafter Glennon] (arguing that the judge’s practice of allowing step-parents 
to adopt forced the legislature to codify adoption in 1970). Other reasons for the 
amendments include clarification of the laws as well as streamlining of adoption 
procedure to make it simpler and faster. Id. 
31 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101-2910 (West 2003); JOINT STATE 
GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, Proposed Adoption Act, Leg. J., 182 (Pa. 1970) 
(the Act was passed but with modest legislative history). See Adoption of 
C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); Adoption of R.B.F. and 
R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 741 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out that the Adoption Act of 1970, July 24, P.L. 620, No. 208 § 601(a) 
states that “the act of April 4, 1925 (P.L.127), entitled ‘An act relating to 
Adoption,’ is hereby repealed absolutely”). 
32 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (West 2001) (“Any individual may 
become an adopting parent.”); § 2311 (“Any individual may be adopted, 
regardless of his age or residence.”); § 2710 (The petition requirements include 
information about the adopting parent such as name, residence, marital status, 
age occupation, religious affiliation, racial background and their relationship to 
the adoptee.). Also, the petition must include copies of all section 2711 consents 
required by the Adoption Act relating to consents necessary to adoption or the 
basis upon which such consents are not required. See § 2710. Finally, a copy of 
the adoptee’s birth certificate must be included. See id. 
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system still reflects the traditional view of adoption as a secret 
process,33 in that petitions and hearings remain closed to the public 
and obtaining access to adoption records remains a challenge.34 
Modern adoption law creates the process by which a parent-
child relationship is legally formed between a child and an adult 
who is not the child’s biological parent.35 Following an adoption, 
the birth parent relinquishes and the adoptive parent assumes all of 
the biological parent’s rights and responsibilities.36 There are 
exceptional circumstances, such as stepparent adoptions, where a 
judicial decree will not end the legal relationship between a child 
and the members of her biological family.37 Only the courts may 
order adoption, and a prospective adoptive parent must seek the 
court’s permission to adopt by filing a petition. 38 After the petition 
is filed, the court orders an investigation and report to be filed, 
which helps determine the child’s eligibility for adoption and the 
                                                          
33 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 203 (explaining that the child is 
usually left unaware of the adoption in order to “shield the birth mother from the 
stigma of having given birth to a child out-of-wedlock and to mask the adoptive 
parents’ inability to conceive a child”). 
34 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504.1 (2003). The statute states in pertinent 
part: 
The court shall take such steps as are reasonably necessary to assure 
that the identity of the adoptive parent or parents is not disclosed 
without their consent in any proceeding under this subchapter or 
Subchapter B (relating to involuntary termination). The Supreme Court 
may prescribe uniform rules under this section relating to such 
confidentiality. 
Id. For a discussion on adoption proceedings and the confidentiality of the 
various records, see LESTER WALLMAN & LAWRENCE J. SCHWARZ, HANDBOOK 
OF FAMILY LAW 78 (1989) (discussing adoption proceedings and the 
confidentiality of the various records). 
35 See WALLMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 34, at 77 (detailing the legal 
process of adoption). 
36 Id. at 108 (discussing the legal effects of adoption). 
37 Id. at 107. 
38 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (West 2001) (“The court of 
common pleas of each county shall exercise through the appropriate division 
original jurisdiction over voluntary relinquishment, involuntary termination and 
adoption proceedings.”). 
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suitability of the placement.39 After evaluating the child’s best 
interest, the judge decides whether to approve the adoption.40 The 
judge makes her decision after examining the petition for adoption, 
obtaining all necessary consents and conducting a hearing.41  
                                                          
39 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2525 (West 2001) (The statute states in 
pertinent part: 
The court shall cause an investigation to be made and a report filed 
by . . . an appropriate person designated by the court . . . . The 
investigation shall cover all pertinent information regarding the child’s 
eligibility for adoption and the suitability of the placement, including 
the physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child, and 
the child’s and the adopting parent’s age, sex, health and racial, ethnic 
and religious background. 
Id. 
40 In re McQuinton’s Adoption, 86 A. 205, 269 (Pa. 1913) (finding that the 
Adoption Act required the court to decree adoption liberally because it gave 
children greater opportunities for the fullest development). 
The general purpose of the act in question is unmistakable; it is the 
expression of the humane and benevolent sentiments of the legislature 
that passed it towards a dependent class of our population, many 
members of which, by reason of conditions for which they are not 
responsible, and which, because of infancy they have no power to 
overcome, are, if not entirely helpless in the struggle of life, so far 
prejudiced and handicapped by their environment that fair opportunity 
to develop into virtuous men and women is denied them. It therefore 
calls for a liberal construction to the end that it may fairly accomplish 
the purpose of the enactment. 
Id. See also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2724 (a)-(b) (West 2001) (setting forth 
factors taken into account in evaluating the child’s best interests). Section 
2724(b) states that: 
The court shall hear testimony in support of the petition and such 
additional testimony as it deems necessary to inform it as to the 
desirability of the proposed adoption . . . . In any case, the age, sex, 
health, social and economic status or racial, ethnic or religious 
background of the child or adopting parents shall not preclude an 
adoption but the court shall decide its desirability on the basis of the 
physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
41 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2724 (West 2001) (stating that at the hearing, 
testimony can be given in support of the petition and an investigation can be 
ordered to verify the statements of the petition or other facts to determine the 
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Therefore case law provides guidance in areas that the legislature 
has not yet acted, such as the articulation of desirable and 
undesirable adoptive situations.42 
B. Development of Second-Parent Adoption 
In order to promote finality in adoption proceedings, most state 
laws include a cut-off provision prohibiting adoption by an 
unmarried partner unless the parental rights of the first parent are 
terminated.43 This provision allows the new family to develop 
without fear of intrusion from the biological parents.44 There is a 
                                                          
desirability of the adoption); see also WALLMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 34, at 
78 (stating that the adoption will be approved when the court has reviewed the 
results of the hearing, all legal requirements have been met and the court finds it 
is in the best interest of the child). 
42 See, e.g., Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1979) (holding that a 
parent’s qualified consent to an adoption of his child by another who is not his 
spouse is not permissible under the law). 
43 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 1999) (“After the 
making of an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child . . . shall 
have no rights over such adoptive child or his property by descent or 
succession.”); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 210, § 6 (West 1999) (“All rights, 
duties and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent 
shall . . . terminate between the child so adopted and his natural parents and 
kindred.”); See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2903 (West 2000) (“Whenever a 
parent consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child 
relationship between him and his child shall remain whether or not he is one of 
the petitioners in the adoption proceeding.”) Wisconsin has a similar provision. 
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.92(2) (2001) (“After the order of adoption is entered 
the relationship of parent and child between the adopted person and the adopted 
person’s birth parents, unless the birth parent is the spouse of the adoptive 
parent, shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties and other legal 
consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.”). 
44 See Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, 
Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 937 
(2000) (arguing that adoption is traditionally seen as a process where one family 
ends and a new one begins); see also WALLMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 34, at 
108. Wallman and Schwarz explain the legal effect of adoption: 
An order of adoption terminates any rights the natural parents 
previously had with respect to the child and vice versa. Through the 
adoption process a new lineage results and a child possesses the same 
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statutory exception to the cut-off provision for stepparents, which 
allows the spouse of a birth parent or of an adoptive parent to 
adopt the child without terminating any initial parental rights.45 
The rationale behind the stepparent exception derives from the 
custodial biological parent’s plan to raise the child with the 
stepparent.46 This is because the government believes that if the 
non-custodial biological parent approves of the adoption or is no 
longer a part of the child’s life there will be no animosity among 
the parties to disrupt finality, and it will be in the best interest of 
the child to have this additional step-parent adopt her.47 
The statutory section, however, does not apply to same-sex 
couples because under Pennsylvania law, same-sex couples are not 
permitted to marry.48 Thus if the custodial legal parent desires his 
same-sex partner to possess the legal status of parent, he cannot 
achieve this without superseding his own parental rights.49 This 
                                                          
status he would have had if he was born to the adoptive parents. For 
example, once adopted, the child has the right to be supported by the 
adoptive parents and the right to inherit from and through them. 
Id. 
45 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2903 (West 2000) (“Whenever a parent 
consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child relationship 
between him and his child shall remain whether or not he is one of the 
petitioners in the adoption proceeding.”). Wisconsin has a similar provision.  See 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.92(2) (2001) (“After the order of adoption is entered the 
relationship of parent and child between the adopted person and the adopted 
person’s birth parents, unless the birth parent is the spouse of the adoptive 
parent, shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties and other legal 
consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.”); see also Schacter, supra 
note 44, at 937 (“State adoption statutes generally recognize an exception to this 
cut-off provision for stepparent adoptions, which, by some tallies, have come to 
compromise the majority of all adoptions.”). 
46 See Schacter, supra note 44, at 937. 
47 See Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: 
On Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of The Child, 
66 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (1999) (discussing the different types of adoption). 
48 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2000) (“Marriage shall be 
between one man and one woman . . . [and] a marriage between persons of the 
same-sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if 
valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.”). 
49 When a lesbian woman or gay man becomes a parent through adoption 
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statutory cut-off provision is problematic for same-sex couples 
trying to adopt. The child’s legal parent does not wish to relinquish 
his parental rights, yet he cannot fall under the spousal exception, 
which would allow both parents to possess legal rights.50 
Not all courts apply cut-off provisions to forbid same-sex 
adoptions. In Vermont, for instance, the Supreme Court permitted 
adoption by a lesbian couple without requiring termination of the 
biological mother’s rights, finding that adoption is in the best 
interest of the children when the partner has been living with the 
biological mother since the children’s births and the wording of the 
statute does not expressly prohibit such an adoption.51 Similarly, in 
Massachusetts, the Supreme Court permitted a lesbian parent’s 
same-sex partner to adopt the parent’s biological child.52 The Court 
found it would be in the best interest of the child because the 
women had a stable and committed relationship, both women 
                                                          
or alternative insemination, the law acknowledges that person as having full and 
absolute parental rights. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 
1 (explaining the process of alternative insemination); see In the Matter of the 
Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (granting 
the adoption of a child by its biological mother’s lesbian partner); The lesbian or 
gay parent’s partner may function as a second-parent, but he or she may not 
have any formal legal rights with respect to the child; see, e.g., In re Adoption of 
B.L.P., 16 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 95, 98 (Montg. Co. Orphans’ Ct. Pa. 1998) (rejecting 
the application of a lesbian partner to become an adoptive parent of a child); see 
also Schacter, supra note 44, at 936 (stating that “there is a disturbing 
asymmetry between the profound emotional bonds that may link a child to a 
non-biological parent and the law, which, in the absence of second-parent 
adoption, is likely to treat that parent as a “legal stranger” to the child). 
50 See, e.g., Georgina G. v. Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) 
(holding that an adoption of the child by the biological mother’s same-sex 
partner would sever the biological mother’s ties with the child). The court also 
found that the legislature specifically exempted stepparent adoptions from 
cutting off parental rights, and therefore the court presumed that the legislature 
did not intend to exempt adoptions by non-marital partners, concluding that the 
cut-off provision was mandatory for non-marital partners. Id. 
51 Adoptions of B.L.V.B, 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); 15 VT. STAT. ANN. 
§301 (West 2002) (stating “legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations of 
parents [are] to be established for benefit of children”); 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 665 
(stating custody to be awarded upon the best interests of child). 
52 Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993). 
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participated jointly in raising the child, the child viewed both 
women as parents, and the child would gain the practical benefits 
from the legal recognition of a second-parent.53 The highest courts 
of New York and the District of Columbia have also approved the 
adoption of children by their parents’ same-sex partners.54 In 
addition, lower courts in a number of other states have all approved 
second-parent adoption by same-sex couples.55 
Courts that have permitted such adoptions generally conclude 
that children are best served by having two legal parents rather 
than one legal parent and one de facto parent.56 A child with two 
legal parents has two sources of support and inheritance rights, as 
well as access to an array of benefits, including health insurance, 
social security and other benefits provided by the parents’ 
                                                          
53 Id; MA. STAT. 210 §1 (West 2002) (“A person of full age may petition 
the probate court in the county where he resides for leave to adopt as his child 
another person younger than himself . . . (iii) the granting of the petition is in the 
best interests of the child.”). Practical benefits include the child gaining access 
to the second-parents health insurance coverage and additional inheritance 
benefits. Id. 
54 See, e.g., In re Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that 
provision of adoption statute terminating biological parent’s rights toward 
adoptive child does not apply in situations when biological parent consents to 
adoption, agrees to retain parental rights, and agrees to raise child together with 
adopting parent). The court did not require the termination of the parental rights 
of biological mothers who consented to adoption of their respective children by 
an unmarried man and lesbian partner with whom the mothers shared long-term 
emotional and financial commitments. See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 117(1)(a) (“After 
the making of an order of adoption the birth parents of the adoptive child shall 
be relieved of all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall 
have no rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or 
succession, except as hereinafter stated.”); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 
1995) (holding that gay and lesbian partners have standing under New York and 
Washington D.C. law to become adoptive parents, and the portions of the 
statutes purporting to terminate the biological mothers’ parental rights do not 
apply). 
55 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 285 (discussing the current status of 
second-parent adoption law in various states). 
56 See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 346 (reporting on cases where courts have 
sanctioned second-parent adoption because of the benefits to the child). An 
individual becomes a de facto parent when they have assisted in the raising of a 
child to such a degree that it as if they are actually the child’s parent). Id. 
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employers.57 If the adults’ relationship later ends, their status as the 
child’s legal parents gives them both standing to seek custody or 
visitation with the child.58 Additionally, both legal parents could be 
required to continue to support the child.59 
With adoption law currently in a state of flux because each 
state has different laws, the National Conference of 
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved a 
new Uniform Adoption Act in 1994, which has been forwarded to 
all fifty states with a recommendation that it be enacted by their 
legislatures.60 This model law seeks to promote the interest of 
children in being raised by parents, including same-sex couples, 
who are committed and capable of caring for them.61 The model 
law departs from the historical practice of categorically excluding 
whole classes of prospective adoptive parents on the basis of 
marital status, sexual orientation or other arbitrary factors, and 
seeks to protect children’s ties to the people who have actually 
raised them.62 
                                                          
57 Id. 
58 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 229. 
59 See L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (finding that a 
lesbian that has the status of in loco parentis to the biological child of her former 
partner must pay child support). 
60 Unif. Adoption Act 2-401-09, 9 U.L.A. (1994). The prefatory note of the 
Act states: 
The Act aims to be a comprehensive and uniform state adoption code 
that: (1) is consistent with relevant federal constitutional and statutory 
law; (2) delineates the legal requirements and consequences of different 
kinds of adoption; (3) promotes the integrity and finality of adoptions 
while discouraging “trafficking” in minors; (4) respects the choices 
made by the parties to an adoption about how much confidentiality or 
openness they prefer in their relations with each other, subject, 
however, to judicial protection of the adoptee’s welfare; and (5) 
promotes the interest of minor children in being raised by individuals 
who are committed to, and capable of, caring for them. 
Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. (stating that the NCCUSL wants to “encourage different kinds of 
people to adopt and prohibit the categorical exclusion of anyone from being 
considered as an adoptive parent”). 
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In addition the American Academy of Pediatrics recently 
published a study on the benefits of second-parent adoption.63 The 
study found that legal endorsement of second-parent adoption 
achieves greater custodial rights and responsibilities for the 
adoptive parent protecting the child if the biological or original 
adoptive parent becomes unable to take care of the child or the 
couple separates.64 Legal endorsement also ensures the child’s 
eligibility for health benefits, inheritance and social security 
survivor benefits from both parents, and provides legal grounds for 
either parent to offer their consent for medical care, or make 
educational and other important decisions on behalf of the child.65 
The American Academy of Pediatrics therefore supports legislative 
and legal efforts to permit adoption of the child by the second-
parent in gay and lesbian families.66 
The recommendations proposed neither by NCCUSL nor by 
the American Academy of Pediatrics have been implemented in 
                                                          
63 See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4. The study 
evaluated evidence, gathered during several decades using diverse samples and 
methodologies, of the impact of gay or lesbian parents on children, and 
concluded that a child’s development will improve if the relationship of their 
homosexual parents is recognized by law because there will likely be less 
conflict and more stability in the home. Id. 
64 See L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 874 (finding that a lesbian that has the 
status of in loco parentis to the biological child of her former partner must pay 
child support); see, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 9, at 344 (discussing the implication 
of Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App.1991)). In this case a 
lesbian couple planned to have a child together, and then one of the women 
conceived and had the child. Id. at 219. Later the biological mother was killed in 
a car accident and the court found the women who did not give birth to the child 
was not a parent and thus could not have custody to the child, despite the 
planning and caring for the child. Id. 
65 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. See, e.g., Jacobs, 
supra note 9, at 347 (discussing the benefits of recognizing second-parent 
adoptions). 
66 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (finding that when 
two adults raise a child, they and the child deserve the security that comes along 
with legal recognition because denying proper parental legal status prevents 
“children from enjoying the psychologic[al] and legal security that comes from 
having 2 willing, capable, and loving parents”). 
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Pennsylvania.67 There is, however, no statutory or common law 
prohibition against gays and lesbians or unmarried couples 
adopting in Pennsylvania.68 Instead, couples are required to 
demonstrate why the adoption is desirable, and judicial 
determinations are made on a case-by-case basis.69 
Judicially approved adoptions, which require the court to create 
an exception to the Adoption Act, were not available in 
Pennsylvania until the decision in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and 
R.C.G.70 For example, in In re Adoption of E.M.A, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the father’s qualified 
consent (consenting to adoption without fully relinquishing 
parental rights, as seen in stepparent adoption) was not sufficient to 
meet the statutory requirement when a non-spouse sought to 
adopt.71 The court stated that, “our courts have no authority to 
                                                          
67 See Glennon, supra note 30, at 265, 276 (stating that the Pennsylvania 
Adoption Act has some similar wording to the model law but the model law 
remains unadopted. Glennon also argues that the recommendations of social 
scientists such as the American Academy of Pediatrics are not followed). 
68 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2002). 
One state expressly prohibits gays and lesbians from adopting. FLA. STAT. CH. 
63.042(3) (1999) (providing that “no person eligible to adopt under this statute 
may adopt if that person is a homosexual”). 
69 Id. at 1202. In states that do not expressly prohibit gays and lesbians 
from adopting, the judicial system determines whether the second-parent 
receives legal rights with respect to the adopted child. Adoption of R.B.F. and 
R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(stating “[o]ur legislature . . . has already recognized that the trial judges who 
are on the front lines of these adoption proceeding are best situated to determine 
an appropriate procedure to follow in cases where there is a void of authority in 
the Adoption Act.” See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 2000) 
(denying custody to the former same-sex partner of a lesbian mother because it 
would be to disruptive for the family but granting visitation rights); E.N.O. v. 
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999) (granting a former lesbian same-sex 
partner visitation rights after the couple separated); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 
533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (denying custody to the former same sex 
partner and remanding the issue of visitation rights to determine if it was in the 
best interest of the child). 
70 In re Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10, 11 (Pa. 1979). 
71 Id. Qualified consent means sanctioning the action without relinquishing 
your own rights which is required to effectuate the adoption petition. Id. 
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decree an adoption in the absence of the statutorily required 
consents. Nor may exceptions to the Adoption Act be judicially 
created where the Legislature did not see fit to create them.”72 The 
court’s language made same-sex couples wary of their chances of 
success in adoption proceedings in Pennsylvania.73 Even with such 
strong language, fourteen county courts in Pennsylvania allowed 
for second-parent adoption.74 In November 2000, second-parent 
adoptions in Pennsylvania were suspended pending appeal of In re 
Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and 
R.C.F., Pennsylvania state cases in which two gay couples’ 
adoption petitions were rejected.75 This fractured societal 
framework, including the complex statutory conditions, formed the 
background in which R.B.F. was litigated. 
II.  PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF R.B.F. ET AL. 
The decision in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G.76 
consolidates two cases on appeal: In re Adoption of C.C.G. and 
Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.77 This decision 
confirms that same-sex adoption is possible under current 
Pennsylvania law.78 
                                                          
72 Id. at 11. 
73 See Glennon, supra note 30, at 277 (arguing that same-sex couple 
adoption precedent hurts the chances that these “families” will attempt to 
become legal through adoption proceedings). 
74 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000); see also Ruling Benefits Gays’ Children: Health Coverage, Inheritance, 
Social Security Rights Widened, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 22, 2002, at 
B-1 (discussing the various approaches county courts in Pennsylvania took to 
second-parent adoption). 
75 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 740; In re Adoption of 
C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 727-28. (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
76 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002). 
77 Id. at 1199. 
78 Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, did not answer other 
legal questions implicated by same-sex adoption, such as whether the 
constitutional concept of equal protection requires that adoption petitions of 
same-sex couples be granted. See Glennon, supra note 30, at 260 (discussing 
other arguments that gay couples may have to defend their adoption petitions 
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A.  In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G. 
In In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., the appellants, J.C.G. 
and J.J.G., have been gay domestic partners in Pennsylvania since 
1982.79 In 1991, J.J.G. legally adopted C.C.G., and in 1999, J.J.G. 
legally adopted his second child, Z.C.G.80 After the adoptions, the 
children and the appellants lived together as a family.81 In June of 
1998, J.C.G., the gay partner and prospective adopting parent, 
legally changed his last name to that of J.J.G., the legal parent.82 In 
May of 1999, appellants, J.J.G. and J.C.G. filed a petition pursuant 
to the Adoption Act wherein the gay partner sought to adopt the 
children.83 The petition was required by statute to contain a 
consent form relinquishing the parental rights of J.J.G. 84 The 
appellants intentionally omitted the language indicating permanent 
surrender of J.J.G.’s parental rights.85 
On June 18, 1999, the Erie County Common Pleas Court issued 
an order denying the adoption petition because the father failed to 
relinquish his parental rights as required under section 2711(d) of 
                                                          
being denied). This note, however, will focus on the procedural process of 
R.B.F. to develop a better understanding of how and why the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held as it did. 
79 Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 730. 
82 Id. at 726. See text accompanying note 48 (discussing inability of gay 
partners to legally marry). 
83 Id. 
84 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(D)(1) (West 2002) (requiring the 
consenting parent of an adoptee under the age of eighteen to provide a statement 
relinquishing parental rights to his child). The statute states in pertinent part: 
I hereby voluntarily and unconditionally consent to the adoption of the 
above named child. I understand that by signing this consent I indicate 
my intent to permanently give up all rights to this child. I understand 
such child will be placed for adoption . . . . I have read and understand 
the above and I am signing it as a free and voluntary act. 
Id. 
85 In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 727-28. (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2000). 
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Pennsylvania law.86 Appellants filed a motion requesting the trial 
court withdraw its order.87 On June 19, 1999, the trial court 
affirmed its order and Appellants filed an appeal.88 On June 19, 
2000 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial of the 
adoption petition.89 
B.  In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F. 
In In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., the appellants, C.H.F. 
and B.A.F., are a lesbian couple who have been domestic partners 
in Pennsylvania since 1983.90 In 1996, after deciding to raise a 
family together, C.H.F. conceived through in vitro fertilization 
with an anonymous donor.91 B.A.F. legally changed her last name 
to that of appellant C.H.F. before the twins were born on March 
11, 1997.92 On April 24, 1998, appellants filed a petition with the 
Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County seeking adoption of 
the children by B.A.F.93 Similar to the companion case of In re 
Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G.,94 appellant C.H.F. intentionally 
omitted statutorily required language from the petition 
permanently relinquishing her parental rights.95 
On October 22, 1998, the trial court denied the petition based 
on the appellants’ failure to meet the requirements of the Adoption 
                                                          
86 See id. at 726; § 2711(D)(1) (“The consenting parent of an adoptee under 
the age of eighteen must provide a statement relinquishing parental rights to his 
child.”). 
87 See In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 726. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 730. The denial of the adoption petition was affirmed for lacking 
the parental relinquishment required by statute. Id. 
90 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1198-99 (Pa. 
2002). 
91 Id. 
92 Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); 
In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 727-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000). 
93 Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 740. 
94 Id. 
95 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1198. 
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Act by omitting the parental rights relinquishment language.96 The 
appellants appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment.97 The appellants then filed a motion for 
reargument and reconsideration, which was granted.98 The court 
nonetheless affirmed the denial of the petition on June 19, 2000, 
the same day as the petition in In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G. 
was denied.99 The Superior Court issued almost identical opinions 
for In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of 
R.B.F. and R.C.F.100 
1. Superior Court Majority Opinion from In re Adoption of 
C.C.G. and Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.101 
The majority, noting the appellants’ purposeful omissions of 
the relinquishment requirement from their petitions for adoptions, 
held that the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Adoption 
Act do not permit a non-spouse to adopt a child where the legal 
parents have not relinquished their respective parental rights.102 
The court refused to create judicial exceptions to the requirements 
of the Adoption Act, stating that to do so would overstep into the 
authority of the legislature.103 The Superior Court therefore 
rejected the appellants’ claim that the trial court was afforded 
discretion to waive statutory requirements when “cause had been 
shown,” finding instead that the statutory requirements had not 
been met, and no cause had been shown why they should not be 
                                                          
96 Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 739. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 740. 
99 Id. at 742; In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2000). 
100 In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 726; In re Adoption 
of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 739. Because the opinions are nearly 
identical, the remainder of the discussion of case history in Part II will treat the 
opinions as one. 
101 In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 727-28. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 728 (stating “it is for the legislature to decide whether to expand 
the Adoption Act to cover same-sex partners”). 
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met.104 Without fulfillment of the statutory requirements, the 
analysis of the best interest and general welfare of the children 
would be premature and therefore could not be considered.105 
Consequently, the court denied the petitions.106 
2.  Judge Elliot’s Concurrence in In re Adoption of C.C.G. and 
Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.107 
Judge Elliot, in concurrence, contended that qualified consent 
is only effective in spousal situations because of the narrow 
interpretation of qualified consent in the binding precedent of In re 
Adoption of E.M.A.108 Since the appellants cannot be recognized as 
married, they cannot fall under the spousal exception for qualified 
consent.109 Judge Elliot focused on the holding from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in E.M.A., which insisted on strict 
construction of the Adoption Act and lack of judicial power to 
create exceptions to the Act where the legislature did not grant 
them.110 Judge Elliot suggested that, in light of the precedent and 
the realities of changing families petitioning for adoption, “the 
issue of qualified consent outside of marriage must be re-addressed 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or returned to the Legislature 
for further consideration or amendment.”111 
3. Dissenting Opinions in In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G. 
                                                          
104 Id. at 729. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(2002) (requiring the 
consenting parent of an adoptee under the age of eighteen to provide a statement 
relinquishing parental rights to his child unless cause can be shown as to why 
such parental rights should not be relinquished). 
105 In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 734. 
106 Id. at 733. 
107 Id. at 730. 
108 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000); In re Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1979) (holding that a 
parent’s qualified consent to an adoption of his child by another who is not his 
spouse is not permissible under the law). 
109 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 744. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 744-45. 
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and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.112 
a. Judge Johnson 
Judge Johnson’s dissenting opinion articulated three reasons 
for dissenting from the majority opinion.113 First, Judge Johnson 
argued that section 2711 of the Adoption Act,114 requiring the 
relinquishment of parental rights, should not be strictly construed 
because it “contravenes the mandate of the Statutory Construction 
Act to liberally construe state statutes,115 and is incongruous with 
the legislature’s purpose in enacting section 2711.”116 Judge 
Johnson articulated that the portion of section 2771 requiring 
voluntary relinquishment of parental rights served the limited 
purposes of protecting a parent’s fundamental liberty interest117 
and ensuring finality by preventing the biological parent from 
challenging the adoption.118 Judge Johnson argued that neither of 
those purposes was served because J.J.G.’s relinquishment of his 
parental rights contravened the protection of his fundamental 
                                                          
112 Id. at 745. 
113 Id. Judges Kelly and Todd joined Judge Johnson’s dissent. Id. 
114 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711 (West 2001) (“The consenting parent 
of an adoptee under the age of eighteen must provide a statement relinquishing 
parental rights to his child.”). 
115 See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1501-1991; In re Adoption of R.B.F. and 
R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 741 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); see also 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
1928(a) (stating the “rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be 
strictly construed, shall have no application to the statutes of this 
Commonwealth enacted finally after September 1, 1937”). Because the 
Adoption Act was enacted in 1970, the Act must be liberally construed. Id.; see 
also 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1928(c) (stating that “all other provisions of a statute 
shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and promote justice”). 
116 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 741 (noting that the 
purpose of the Adoption Act is to promote the child’s best interest). 
117 Id. at 746 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). 
118 Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 731 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000) (citing In the Matter of Adoption of Christopher P., 389 A.2d 94, 97 (Pa. 
1978); In re Shapiro, 377 A.2d 153, 155 (Pa. 1977)). 
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liberty interest.119 In addition, J.J.G. was a party to the petition for 
adoption and the only person possessing legal rights to the 
children.120 Therefore, no finality issue existed because J.J.G. 
would not challenge the adoption later since he was a voluntary 
party to the petition from its inception. 121 
Second, Judge Johnson stated that the majority erroneously 
relied on cases involving involuntary termination of parental 
rights, while this case involved retention of parental rights.122 
Judge Johnson argued that in failing to make the distinction, the 
majority overlooked the trial court’s discretion in granting 
adoption petitions pursuant to section 2901 of the Adoption Act.123 
He stated that the “cause shown” language in section 2901 allows 
the court to determine that an adoption should be granted, and the 
court may do so even though a parent’s rights have not been 
terminated.124 He argued that the majority’s reading of the 
termination clause, which would restrict the trial court from 
considering reasons why the adoption should be granted without 
meeting the termination provisions, effectively eliminates the 
“cause shown” language, rendering the clause superfluous.125 
                                                          
119 In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 732 (asserting that 
J.J.G.’s fundamental liberty interest is his maintaining his parental rights). Id. 
120 Id. at 726. 
121 Id. 
122 J.J.G. never intended to relinquish his parental rights and was only 
seeking to extend parental rights to his partner J.C.G. In re Adoption of C.C.G. 
and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 728. The case in which Judge Johnson believed the 
majority erroneously relied on is In re Adoption of E.M.A. 409 A.2d. 10 (Pa. 
1979), discussed supra note 108. 
123 In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 733-34 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2000); see also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (West 2001) (stating in 
pertinent part that “[u]nless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no 
decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or parents’ rights 
have been terminated . . . and all other legal requirements have been met”). 
124 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 746 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000). 
125 Id. at 747 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mack Bros. Motor Car Co., 59 
A.2d 923, 925 (Pa. 1948) and Commonwealth v. Baumer A.2d 472, 474 (Pa. 
Super. 1968) and citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §1922(2) (stating that the General 
Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain)). It states “The 
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Johnson concluded that where petitioners are seeking to add a 
parent, and no fundamental parental rights are at risk, section 
2901’s “cause shown language” gives the court discretion to 
dispense with the parental termination requirement of section 
2711.126 He articulated that in cases where no fundamental parental 
rights are at risk, the court’s examination should focus on the 
child’s best interest rather than the termination of parental rights.127 
Third, Judge Johnson stated that the majority’s focus should 
not have been on the homosexual relationships between the 
petitioners, but on the parent-child relationship and the benefits 
that adoption would offer the children.128 He argued that the 
majority’s failure to recognize the reality of gay and lesbian 
couples raising children “perpetuates the fiction of family 
homogeneity at the expense of the children whose reality does not 
fit this form.”129 He noted that while the children’s daily lives 
would not be altered by the denial of the petition, they would have 
less legal protection available.130 For those reasons, Johnson 
concluded that the majority of the court was incorrect in denying 
the adoption and should have used it’s discretion to decree the 
adoption on the basis of the best interests of the child.131 
b. Judge Todd 
Judges Kelly and Johnson joined Judge Todd’s dissenting 
                                                          
legislature cannot, however be deemed to intend that language used in a statute 
shall be superfluous and without import.” Id. 
126 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 742. 
127 Id. at 748. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 744. 
130 Id. at 748 (stating that the child will have less legal protection because 
they will not be able to inherit from the denied parent or receive health benefits 
from that parent’s employer). 
131 Id. at 752. See also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (“Unless the court 
for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered 
unless the natural parent or parents’ rights have been terminated.”). This gives 
trial judges discretion to decree a petition for adoption upon cause shown as to 
why the statutory requirements need not be met. Id. 
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opinion which focused heavily on the child/parent relationships 
that were already established and deserved legal recognition in 
these cases.132 Judge Todd emphasized the impact of the majority’s 
decision on the children involved and argued that second-parent 
adoption was consistent with Pennsylvania law based on the trial 
court’s discretion to decree these adoptions pursuant to section 
2901.133 He found that second-parent adoption advances the 
welfare of the children involved because it recognizes a “real 
family” where the parents have co-parented the children since birth 
and are trying to provide for those children by gaining the legal 
rights and benefits associated with adoption.134 These benefits 
“include the legal protection of the children’s existing familial 
bonds, their rights to financial support from two parents instead of 
one, rights to inheritance from each parent and rights to obtain 
other available dependent benefits, such as health care, insurance 
and Social Security benefits, from either parent.”135 He concluded 
that the majority’s failure to focus on the best interest of the child 
was erroneous, and further, that the trial court abused its discretion 
when it dismissed appellants’ petition for adoption without holding 
a hearing to determine whether good cause had been shown to 
allow the adoption.136 
C. State High Court Decision 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted appeal in both 
cases and consolidated the actions.137 In Adoption of R.B.F. and 
                                                          
132 Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 751. 
133 Id. at 752. 
134 Id. at 751. 
135 Id. 
136 Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000). See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2724(a) (West 2003) (stating that “the 
court shall hear testimony in support of the petition and such additional 
testimony as it deems necessary to inform it as to the desirability of the proposed 
adoption”). 
137 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002). The 
actions were consolidated because they came to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court at essentially the same time and based on the similarity of facts. Id. 
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R.C.G., the Court decided whether the Adoption Act requires a 
biological or adoptive legal parent to relinquish his parental rights 
in cases where a same-sex partner seeks to adopt the legal parent’s 
child.138 On August 20, 2002, the Court unanimously vacated the 
orders of the Superior Court and remanded the appellants’ cases to 
the trial court to determine whether “cause [was] shown” for the 
parental relinquishment requirements to be waived.139 While the 
Court agreed with the lower court in the E.M.A. case in that the 
judiciary could not read exceptions into statutes,140 the Court said 
that E.M.A. was distinguishable because of an amendment to 
section 2901 passed subsequent to the E.M.A. decision.141 The 
Court stated: 
There is no reasonable construction of the Section 2901 
“cause shown” language other than to conclude that it 
permits a petitioner to demonstrate why, in a particular 
case, he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements. 
Upon a showing of cause, the trial court is afforded 
discretion to determine whether the adoption petition 
should, nevertheless, be granted.142 
The Court further stated that in determining “cause” under section 
2901, courts must consider what is the best interest of the child 
because otherwise there is no guarantee that children will be 
protected.143 An evaluation of the child’s best interest could be 
done prior to satisfying all of the statutory requirements.144 
The Court expanded its interpretation and definition of “cause 
shown” by tracking the reasoning from a prior state court decision, 
In Re Long.145 In In re Long, the adoptee sought access to her 
                                                          
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1201. 
141 Id. 
142 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1201-02 (Pa. 
2002) (emphasis in original). 
143 Id. at 1202. 
144 See id. at 1203 (stating that initially evaluating the child’s best interest 
would speed the review immensely). 
145 Id. (quoting In re Long, 745 A.2d 673 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)). In re Long 
did not directly deal with section 2901 but did deal with “cause shown” 
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adoption records.146 Section 2905 of the Adoption Act granted 
such access if requested pursuant to an order of the court finding 
cause shown.147 In interpreting In re Long, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court “described cause for disclosure as a determination, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that the adoptee’s need for 
adoption information clearly outweighed the considerations behind 
the statute” of keeping adoption records closed.148 Therefore the 
Court concluded that appellants should be given an opportunity at 
an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that the component of 
section 2711(d) requiring the relinquishment of parental rights is 
unnecessary or is satisfied because of their individual 
circumstances.149 For example, the appellants would have to show 
that there would be no violation of the biological or adoptive legal 
parent’s rights because that parent was voluntarily a party to the 
adoption petition from inception.150 
III.  ANALYSIS 
In deciding In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G., the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the child’s best interest 
was served by allowing the petition to go forward without 
requiring the biological or adoptive legal parent to relinquish his 
parental rights.151 This decision promotes the child’s best interest 
because it protects the liberty interest of the legal parent while 
promoting security for the child by offering her the benefits of two 
                                                          
language from another section of the Adoption Act. Id. 
146 Id.; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 2905(a) (2002). Section 2905 provides 
that all adoption records “shall be kept in the files of the court as a permanent 
record thereof and withheld from inspection except on an order of court granted 
upon cause shown . . . .” Id. 
147 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1204 (quoting In re 
Long, 745 A.2d 673 (Pa. Super. 2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2905(a) 
(West 2000)). 
148 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1204 (quoting In re 
Long, 745 A.2d 673 (Pa. Super. 2000)). 
149 Id. at 1205. 
150 Id. at 1203. 
151 Id. 
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legally responsible adults.152 The child receives the legal rights and 
benefits associated with adoption such as financial and health care 
insurance benefits, inheritance rights to two parents’ estates, and 
legal recognition of already established bonds.153 The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s decision recognizes the reality that many non-
traditional families exist and offers these de facto families the legal 
protections of adoption.154 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision, however, did not 
set a clear standard for when cause is shown; as a result, future 
litigants are left with the uncertainty that a trial judge may still 
determine that cause has not been met and deny a petition even 
when the facts are similar to those in R.B.F.155 The court’s failure 
to categorically hold that the parental termination clause of section 
                                                          
152 See Bruce D. Gill, Comment: Best Interest of the Child? A Critique of 
Judicially Sanctioned Arguments Denying Child Custody to Gays and Lesbians, 
68 TENN. L. REV. 361 (2001) (concluding that denying same-sex couples legal 
parent status through adoption only hurts the children and is done because of 
judicial bias). 
153 See In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 737 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2000) (Todd, J., dissenting); In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 
(Mass. 1993) (explaining that adoption would not result in any tangible change 
in the child’s daily life but would entitle her to inheritance, support, and 
insurance from non-biological mother, and would grant the non biological 
mother custody if the biological mother died). 
154 See Glennon, supra note 30, at 282. Glennon argues that: 
Adoption should depend on the demonstrated willingness and ability of 
an adult to provide a child with essential caretaking and nurturing. If a 
parent is willing to bring in another adult to share that burden and 
privilege, and the parent fully understands the consequences of 
allowing another adult to create a legal parent-child relationship with 
that child, the state should not refuse an adoption because of concerns 
about the legal status of the relationship between the adults. 
Id. 
155 See Michael T. Morley, Richard Albert, Jennie L. Kneedler & 
Chrystiane Pereira, Developments in Law and Policy: Emerging Issues in 
Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 199 (2003) (arguing that despite 
many courts recognizing the ability for same-sex couples to adopt, “it still seems 
true that in family law cases involving a homosexual parent, the result ‘will be 
determined more than anything else by the state in which the person lives and 
the judge who hears the case’”). 
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2711 does not apply to second-parent adoptions when the legal 
parent, who is a party to the adoption, wishes to retain their 
parental rights, harms the children at issue because the rule fails to 
extend the full protection of the law to children existing in these 
non-traditional families.156 A categorical holding refusing to apply 
the parental termination clause in second-parent adoption cases 
would provide these families a buttress, which would allow them 
to thrive under the same legal protections given to traditionally 
structured families.157 
A.  The Best Interest of the Child 
The purpose of the Adoption Act is to serve the best interest of 
the child.158 The analysis of the best interest of the child standard, 
used to determine the appropriateness of adoption, focuses on the 
emotional, physical, and mental needs and welfare of the child.159 
Interestingly, no statutory provision denies same-sex couples from 
jointly adopting a child who has no legal parents.160 For example, 
section 2312 of the adoption law says, “anyone may adopt.”161 
Prohibiting adoptions merely because the children are either the 
biological or adopted children of one of the partners prior to filing 
of the adoption petition is illogical when juxtaposed with same-sex 
                                                          
156 See Becker, supra note 17, at 168 (arguing that a child may experience 
material and psychological deprivation if the de facto parent relationship is not 
legally recognized through adoption). 
157 See Unif. Adoption Act, supra note 60 (stating that the states should 
“clarify the legal and economic consequences of different types of adoption so 
that, within these formal structures, the emotional and psychological aspects of 
adoptive parent and child relationships can flourish”). 
158 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2723 (West 2001) (stating that the court 
“[s]hall decide the desirability of an adoption on the basis of the physical, 
mental, and emotional needs and welfare of the child”); In re Adoption of Hess, 
608 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1992) (stating that the Adoption Act “clearly focuses on 
the needs of the child”). 
159 In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1992); see also 23 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2723 (defining the best interest of the child standard). 
160 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002). 
161 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (1981) (stating “any individual may 
become an adopting parent”). 
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couples’ ability to adopt a child with no legal parents.162 
Moreover, the adoption of a child by the parent’s same-sex 
partner would only benefit the child, particularly when the parents 
and children want the adoption to go forward.163 The court in In re 
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G. stated, “It is a settled rule that in the 
construction of statutes, an interpretation is never to be adopted 
that would defeat the purpose of the enactment, if any other 
reasonable construction can be found which its language will fairly 
bear.”164 The best interest of the child, the primary purpose of the 
enactment, is served by having two legally recognized parents 
because adoption offers greater emotional and financial security.165 
The law should recognize the de facto parent-child relationship 
between a child and her parent’s same-sex partner to protect the 
two from “remaining strangers in the eyes of the law.”166 
A recent study by the American Academy of Pediatrics found 
that the legal endorsement provided by second-parent adoption 
achieves the following: 
1. Guarantees that the second-parent’s custody rights and 
responsibilities will be protected if the first parent were to 
die or become incapacitated. Moreover, second-parent 
adoption protects the child’s legal right of relationship with 
both parents. In the absence of coparent adoption, members 
                                                          
162 See Strasser, supra note 47, at 1046 (commenting on the absurdity of 
laws that allow gay and lesbian individuals to adopt but prohibit gay and lesbian 
couples from doing the same.). 
163 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1203. 
164 Id. (citing In re McQuinston’s Adoption, 86 A. 205, 206 (Pa. 1913)). 
165 See Glennon, supra note 30, at 260 (arguing that children do better 
emotionally if they have two legal parents); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 
315, 317 (Mass. 1993) (explaining that adoption would not result in any tangible 
change in the child’s daily life but would entitle her to inheritance, support, and 
insurance from non-biological mother, and would grant the non biological 
mother custody if the biological mother died). 
166 See Becker, supra note 17, at 116 (arguing that a child may experience 
material and psychological deprivation if the de facto parent relationship is not 
legally recognized through adoption); see also Jacobs, supra note 9, at 350 
(stating that the failure of the court to recognize the actual parental relationship 
in these second-parent cases means that many of these people are treated as 
mere third parties rather than as the parent they are to the child). 
LIEBERMAN2.DOC 3/3/2004  1:49 PM 
318 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
of the family of the legal parent, should he or she become 
incapacitated, might successfully challenge the surviving 
coparent’s right to continue to parent the child, thus causing 
the child to lose both parents. 
2. Protects the second-parent’s right to custody and 
visitation if the couple separates. Likewise, the child’s right 
to maintain relationships with both parents after separation, 
viewed as important to the positive outcome in separation 
or divorce of heterosexual parents, would be protected for 
families with gay or lesbian parents. 
3. Establishes the requirement for child support from both 
parents in the event of the parents’ separation. 
4. Ensures the child’s eligibility for health benefits from 
both parents. 
5. Provides legal grounds for either parent to provide 
consent for medical care and to make education, health 
care, and other important decisions on behalf of the child. 
6. Creates the basis for financial security for children in the 
event of the death of either parent by ensuring eligibility to 
all appropriate entitlements, such as Social Security 
survivor benefits.167 
Based on these findings, the American Academy of Pediatrics 
supports legislative and legal efforts that provide the possibility for 
second-parent adoption.168 Additionally, the Uniform Adoption 
                                                          
167 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. 
The American Academy of Pediatrics and its member pediatricians 
dedicate their efforts and resources to the health, safety and well-being 
of all infants, children, adolescents and young adults. The AAP has 
57,000 members in the United States, Canada and Latin America. 
Members include pediatricians, pediatric medical subspecialists and 
pediatric surgical specialists. More than 41,000 members are board-
certified and are called Fellows of the American Academy of 
Pediatrics. 
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, AAP Fact Sheet, available at http://www.aap.org/ 
visit/facts.htm (last modified Jan. 5, 2004). See also supra notes 63-66 and 
accompanying text (discussing the report). 
168 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. 
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Act of 1994 seeks to approve second-parent adoptions where there 
is a demonstrable connection between the child and parent and it is 
in the best interest of the child.169 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, while making strides in 
supporting second-parent adoption, could have better served the 
appellants in R.B.F., future litigants, as well as the children 
involved, if they had followed the recommendations of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics and established clear standards 
on how to determine cause that would allow for simple approval of 
same-sex adoption.170 Had the court categorically held that the 
parental termination clause of section 2711 does not apply to 
second-parent adoptions where the legal parent is a party to the 
adoption and wishes to retain his parental rights, the purpose of the 
Adoption Act to serve the “best interest of the child” would be met 
by granting two parents legal responsibility for the child.171 
Professor Jane Schacter maintains that in analyzing the issues 
raised by second-parent adoption, “the question for the court 
should be whether the child will receive the added legal, emotional 
and financial benefits that would result from acquiring a second 
legal (as opposed to merely functional) parent.”172 By failing to 
establish clear standards and properly frame the analysis, the court 
leaves future litigants in same-sex adoption cases uncertain about 
where they stand in the eyes of the law.173 
                                                          
169 See Unif. Adoption Act, supra note 60. 
170 See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4 (arguing that 
because these kinds of adoption cases are decided mainly by the courts on a 
case-by-case basis, “it is important that a broad ethical mandate exist nationally 
that will guide the courts in providing necessary protection for children through 
coparent adoption”). 
171 See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 391 (concluding that categorical acceptance 
of second-parent adoption after initially determining that the parent/child 
relationship exists and is healthy provides the most supportive environment for 
these families both legally and emotionally). 
172 Schacter, supra note 44, at 942. 
173 See Morley, Albert, Kneedler & Pereira, supra note 155, at 169 
(discussing the confusion caused by current second-parent adoption law). 
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B.  The Rights of the Natural Parent and Finality of Adoption 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that appellants 
should be given an opportunity at an evidentiary hearing to 
demonstrate cause as to whether the purpose of Section 2711(d)’s 
relinquishment of the parental rights component is unnecessary or 
whether it is satisfied because of the individual situation.174 The 
purpose of the relinquishment provision is to protect the rights of 
biological parents and promote finality so the new family can 
develop in peace.175 When the appellants have refused to relinquish 
their parental rights because they want to remain legally bound, it 
is superfluous to require appellants to show why it is unnecessary 
for them to relinquish those rights.176 A court considering the 
unique situation of a second-parent adoption need not be 
concerned with either protecting the natural parents or promoting 
finality. Protecting the natural parent’s rights is a non-issue when 
they are a party to the petition for adoption and wish for the 
adoption by their same-sex partner to take place. Severing the 
natural parent’s rights instead decreases the legal protection 
extended to the child.177 Moreover, promoting finality of adoption 
proceedings is actually accomplished when a second-parent 
adoption is granted because the family already exists, giving the 
legal parent, who is a party to the petition, no reason to challenge it 
later.178 
The court should have held that the termination clause from 
                                                          
174 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing the 
implications of intentionally omitting the consent in the trial court cases). 
175 See In re Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1979) (holding that a 
parent’s qualified consent to an adoption of his child by another who is not his 
spouse is not permissible under the law). 
176 In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002) 
(“When the requisite cause is demonstrated, Section 2901 affords the trial court 
discretion to decree the adoption without termination of the legal parent’s rights 
under Section 2711(d).”). 
177 See Unif. Adoption Act, supra note 60, § 2-401-409 (discussing the 
legal protections extended to a child when second-parent adoptions are granted). 
178 See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass. 1993) (explaining 
that adoption would not result in any tangible change in the child’s daily life). 
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section 2711 does not apply in proceedings where the natural 
parent is both a party to, and in support of, the petition for adoption 
because the necessary cause has been shown by the fact of their 
participation in the petition. 179 The trial court should then have 
analyzed the best interest of the child to determine if this particular 
parent has the emotional and financial interests beneficial to the 
child warranting approval of the petition.180 Rather than focusing 
on irrelevant statutory requirements, the court should instead 
evaluate whether the non-biological or non-adoptive petitioner has 
performed the obligations of parenthood for a substantial period of 
time and whether the relationship between the parent and child is 
publicly recognized. The court should consider whether the child 
believes the second-parent to be their parent.181 If the potential 
adoptive parent has performed these obligations and the 
relationship is publicly recognized, then the intent of the 
petitioners to become legally bound to the child through adoption 
should be effectuated.182 
                                                          
179 In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000), vacated by In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 
2002) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (holding that the Pennsylvania legislature, in 
enacting section 2903, has already recognized that the trial judges who are on 
the front lines of these adoption proceedings are best situated to determine an 
appropriate procedure to follow in cases where there is a void of authority in the 
Adoption Act). 
180 See In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1993). The court stated: 
[W]hile the families of the past may have seemed simple formations 
repeated with uniformity (the so called “traditional family”) families 
have always been complex, multifaceted, and often idealized. This 
court recognizes that families differ in both size and shape and within 
and among the many cultural and socio-economic layers that make up 
this society. We cannot continue to pretend that there is one formula, 
one correct pattern that should constitute a family in order to achieve 
the supportive, loving environment we believe children should inhabit. 
Id. at 554-55. 
181 Jacobs, supra note 9, at 390. 
182 See Duncan, supra note 3, at 66 (citing J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)) (finding that a same-sex partner standing “in loco 
parentis” to a child could seek partial custody if it would serve the best interest 
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A rule that grants these adoptions supports a beneficial 
relationship between prospective adoptive parent and child, and 
protects a natural parent’s liberty interest in their parental rights. A 
rule such as this would also speed the inquiry as to the fitness of 
the adoptive parents because it would skip the examination of 
whether cause has been shown to determine if the petition could go 
forward, and instead would initially examine whether the parent is 
actually fit. An expedited process would effectuate the best interest 
of the child by shortening the time in which the child is without the 
protection of two legal parents.183 
The court’s failure to set a clear mandate that allows for same-
sex adoption when the best interest of the child criteria is met fails 
the state’s children who are part of non-traditional families.184 
While their decision to remand the case was correct, the court 
should have gone further to protect the children and effectuate the 
purpose of the Adoption Act by acknowledging that second-parent 
adoptions are generally in the best interest of the child, 
recognizable under current statutory law and therefore legitimate in 
Pennsylvania. 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE ACTION OR LACK THEREOF 
The legislature should protect the best interests of the state, the 
children and the greater society by codifying second-parent 
adoption.185 The law must acknowledge and reflect the reality that 
non-traditional families are raising children regardless of whether 
or not their petitions for adoption are approved.186 Statutes that in 
                                                          
of the child because the child has established a strong psychological bond with 
the person, and the petitioner has lived with the child and provided care, nurture 
and affection, assuming in the child’s eye a statue like that of a parent). 
183 See Becker, supra note 17, at 133 (discussing the benefits for the child 
when the adoption is quickly adjudicated). 
184 See Glennon, supra note 30, at 271 (arguing that a court’s focus should 
be on how the child will best thrive, not on what the particular family format 
should look like). 
185 See In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993). 
186 See Becker, supra note 17, at 128 (arguing that a child may experience 
material and psychological deprivation if the de facto parent relationship is not 
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practice deny adoption petitions by same-sex couples discriminate 
against them and their families, and in turn, sometimes fail to 
implement what is best for the child.187 Denial of these petitions 
harms the children emotionally by depriving them of the greatest 
protection under the law—it denies the children two legal 
parents.188 The legislature has a duty to clarify any ambiguities in 
the law to offer the highest level of legal protection to its 
children.189 At a minimum, the legislature should make clear that it 
does not support second-parent adoption so that ambiguities about 
its legality are eliminated, and equal protection challenges can go 
forward.190 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL)191 recently supported the movement urging 
legislatures to support second-parent adoptions by approving the 
                                                          
legally recognized through adoption); see also Schacter, supra note 44, at 942 
(discussing the desirability of the law recognizing second-parents). 
187 In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000), vacated by In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 
2002) (Johnson dissenting) (stating that courts should design rules to serve 
children’s best interest and by failing to do so, they perpetuate the fiction of 
family homogeneity at the expense of the children whose reality does not fit this 
form). 
188 See Morley, Albert, Kneedler & Pereira, supra note 155, at 199 
(discussing the status and implications of state laws for and against second-
parent adoptions). 
189 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that it is 
important that a broad ethical mandate exist nationally that will guide policy 
makers in creating initiatives that establish permanency for the children of same-
sex partners through second-parent adoption). 
190 See Schacter, supra note 44, at 946-47 (“It is reasonable . . . to ask 
legislatures to be unmistakably clear if their will is to block second-parent 
adoption. Doing so would clarify the statutory issue, as well as force the 
constitutional question of whether children or their parents have any protected 
right to use the adoption laws made available to other families.”). 
191 See MATTHEW BENDER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE (2001) (stating 
that “NCCUSL is a non-profit organization of state legislators, judges, lawyers, 
and law professors appointed by the governors of every state for the purpose of 
drafting and proposing uniform state legislation on topics normally subject to 
state legislative authority”). 
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Uniform Adoption Act (UAA).192 The Act attempts to manage the 
changing psychosocial and economic aspects of contemporary 
adoption by addressing the many different kinds of adoption that 
now occur and the various functions they serve.193 Moreover, the 
Act encourages secure relationships between children and 
individuals committed to parenting them.194 The American 
Academy of Pediatrics recommends that state legislatures take 
proactive measures to approve second-parent adoption and protect 
children in second-parent family situations.195 If the legislature 
amended the law to explicitly authorize second-parent adoption, 
courts would not need to employ statutory interpretation to furnish 
the legal protection that adoption offers.196 Legislative action 
would help define the best interest of the child standard and 
preempt conflicting lower court decisions in second-parent 
adoption cases.197 A clear statutory provision would also establish 
the right for these children to have two parents legally obligated to 
care for them and recognize that these situations, though 
unconventional, are a reality for a growing number of children.198 
CONCLUSION 
Many gay and lesbian couples with children are still striving to 
create integrated families under the confines of adoption laws, and 
                                                          
192 See Unif. Adoption Act, supra note 60, at § 2-401-409. 
193 See MATTHEW BENDER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 
191. 
194 Id. 
195 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (concluding that 
the weight of evidence gathered during several decades showed children raised 
by lesbian or gay couples were normal and healthy and thus supporting the legal 
adoption of children by second-parents). 
196 Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) 
(Todd, J., dissenting) (stating that no legal mechanism other than adoption can 
offer the legal protection of existing familiar bonds, financial protection and two 
parents to these children). 
197 See Morley, Albert, Kneedler & Pereira, supra note 155, at 197 
(discussing the confusion caused by current second-parent adoption law). 
198 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the growing 
number of same-sex parents). 
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they often continue to be rebuffed.199 The court’s decision in 
R.B.F. makes possible legal recognition of the second-parent, but 
by failing to give the trial court categorical standards for approving 
second-parent adoption, the precedent offers limited support in 
promoting the best interest of the child.200 The Pennsylvania 
legislature should revisit the issue of qualified consent in second-
parent adoptions to bring the law in line with reality and maximize 
the legal protection available to children. 
Second-parent adoption effectuates the main purpose of the 
Adoption Act to promote the best interest of the child.201 Denying 
legal recognition to these families unfairly burdens them. To 
rectify this injustice, the state legislature should either codify 
approval of second-parent adoption, or the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania should categorically approve them to lift the 
injustice. Only then will these families be secure in their status 
under the law. The security provided by legal adoptive status is a 
vital step in upholding the statutory policy of protecting the best 
interest of the child.202 
                                                          
199 See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.L.P., 16 Fiduc. Rep.2d 95, 98 (Montg. Co. 
Orphans’ Ct. Pa. 1998) (rejecting the application of a lesbian partner to become 
an adoptive parent of a child). 
200 See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing the 
implications of a categorical standard). 
201 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2723 (West 2001) (stating that the court 
“[s]hall decide the desirability of an adoption on the basis of the physical, 
mental, and emotional needs and welfare of the child”); In re Adoption of Hess, 
608 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1992) (stating that the Adoption Act “clearly focuses on 
the needs of the child”). 
202 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2724(a)-(b) (West 2001) (setting forth 
factors taken into account in evaluating the child’s best interests). Section 
2724(b) states that: 
The court shall hear testimony in support of the petition and such 
additional testimony as it deems necessary to inform it as to the 
desirability of the proposed adoption . . . . In any case, the age, sex, 
health, social and economic status or racial, ethnic or religious 
background of the child or adopting parents shall not preclude an 
adoption but the court shall decide its desirability on the basis of the 
physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child. 
Id. 
